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The Meritocracy Conundrum in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Nicholas O. Alozie
Arizona State University, USA

The United Nations Development Program’s Global Center for Public Service Excellence (GCPSE) has observed
that “meritocracy in public services has a significant impact on public servants’ motivation,” and warned that “a
motivated and trusted public service will be essential for successful achievement of the 2030 United Nations (UN)
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).” This, at a time when lack of meritocracy is a recurrent theme on the list of
obstacles to sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). From Kenya to Nigeria, to South Africa, there is
no SSA nation where (re)discovering meritocracy is not on top of the policy agenda. Yet, observing the confusion
that ensues when most countries’ elites debate meritocracy, it is not apparent that many have a clear understanding
of the scope of the problem given the paucity of systematic research on the subject. This research investigates three
dimensions of the meritocracy question in SSA: the extent of mass orientation to the meritocracy ideology; the
contemporary status of mass orientation to the meritocracy ideology; and the factors that explain inter-personal
differences in orientation to the meritocracy ideology. It finds that, while orientation varies among individuals and
across countries, mass orientation is robust—notwithstanding the fact that anti-meritocracy forces are contending
powerfully and chipping away at the very foundations of meritocracy. It concludes that the challenge facing SSA in
enthroning meritocracy does not hinge on the capacity to bathe SSA publics with more abstract prescriptions of the
meritocracy creed with a view to expanding mass orientation: there is enough of that already. Rather, it hinges on
the capacity to rein-in powerfully contending anti-meritocracy forces.
Keywords: Meritocracy, Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, development, rationality, efficiency

The absence of meritocracy

1

is both a popular refrain of critical observers and recurrent theme
on the list of obstacles to good governance, institutional dexterity and, ultimately, sustainable
development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Ahlerup, Baskaran, & Bigsten, 2016). Meritocracy’s
absence, some contend, promotes inefficiencies by under- developing and underutilizing human
capital, undercutting and obstructing capacity building, stifling innovation, celebrating
mediocrity, and fostering corruption and resource waste (UNDP, 2015; Tangwa, 2010). Popular
commentary conveys the salience of the meritocracy challenge as it dominates current discourse
on SSA’s development and social change (Amusan, 2016; Otti, 2016; Spio-Garbrah, 2016;
Olowu, Barkan, & Ng׳ethe, 2004).
1

A social system in which people attain positions of power based on their talents, abilities, and performance—rather
than the myriad of other factors typically grouped as particularism—including their money, family connections,
nepotism, tribalism, ethnicity, regionalism, religiosity, party loyalty, and political clientelism.
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Yet, for a supposedly decisive catalyst, the attention paid to meritocracy in SSA has been
largely fleeting—confined primarily to its repercussions for public management (Amusan, 2016;
UNDP, 2015). Rarely discussed is the broader sociological imperative of mass orientation to the
meritocracy creed. Given the nexus between public opinion as shared value, public policy, and
community outcomes, generally (Burstein, 2003), it would appear that an important step to any
realistic discourse on meritocracy, especially as it is linked to ongoing efforts to increase social
efficiency across SSA countries, should embrace assessment of the reservoir of the meritocracy
ideology (MI) in the region’s mass publics. In other words, does the meritocracy creed resonate
with the ordinary Sub-Sahara African? For a social milieu already overburdened by the cultural
legacy of particularism2, focus on the broader sociological imperative can address compelling
questions ranging from the lack of meritocracy in public life itself to the explanations for interpersonal differences in orientation to MI.
This research focuses on three facets of the sociological dimension of the meritocracy
question in SSA. First, it probes the extent of mass orientation to MI and, in so doing, delineates
the contemporary status of mass orientation to MI. Second, it identifies and clarifies the effects
of factors that explain inter-personal differences in orientation to MI. Finally, it illuminates the
consequences of the current state of mass orientation to MI. Data are drawn from Pew’s 2014
Global Attitudes Survey (Pew, 2014) for seven SSA countries (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal,
South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda). While these countries do not represent the entire SSA,
analyzing them sheds some light on this pivotal subject about which systematic, empirical
research is nonexistent. Indeed, given the wide variability of SSA countries culturally,
politically, and socially, as observed by Coffé and Bolzendahl (2011), wholesale generalization
is neither the impetus, nor is it the sine qua non, of the research. Even if extrapolation were not
feasible, and the results are relegated to just the seven countries, systematic analysis of these
questions across these countries must be preferable to the kind of vicious cycle of baseless
speculation that currently shrouds this subject.
To provide some comparative nuance for SSA’s mass orientation profile, data for the
United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK), two of the world’s most
industrialized nations are also displayed. The results suggest a sufficiently high level of mass
orientation to MI, to sustain an environment of meritocracy in SSA. This is apparent whether that
orientation is measured independently or in comparison to the USA or UK. At the same time, the
data also suggest that anti-meritocracy forces are contending powerfully and chipping away at
the very foundations of meritocracy in SSA. Ultimately, this powerful contention becomes the
difference between SSA and the USA/UK.
Meritocracy and Nation Building
As societies embrace capitalism and modernization, they expunge traditional arrangements
(Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart, 1990; Durkheim, 1893). Emphasis on achieving community
cohesion shifts from kinship and familial networks (Durkheim, 1893) to those imperatives that
support social efficiency (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart, 1990). Max Webber’s early
writings on management and bureaucracy laid down the roots of meritocracy as the basis of
social efficiency. Today, the paradigm that higher levels of efficiency are achieved when
individuals are advanced based on talent, abilities, and performance is largely undisputed (Webb
2006). It is encapsulated in MI—even if the meanings and appropriateness (UNDP, 2015; Arrow,
2

These observations are consistent with the classical bureaucratic model that links social efficiency to application of
principles of meritocracy. This is the basis of the Western Civil Service model prevalent in the developing world.
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Bowles, & Durlauf, 1999), measures (Poocharoen & Brillantes, 2013; Ayers, 2010), and
products (Low, 2014; McNamee & Miller, Jr., 2004) of the meritocracy creed itself are still
contested3.
Nations have, either for the exigencies of maintaining internal stability, or, to keep faith
with the incessant march toward capitalism and modernization, bought into the dictum that
“without the possibility of upward mobility through talent and self-determination, social
divisions would become entrenched and ever more bitter” (Daley, 2016, p. 1). Regardless of
culture and place, or by whatever peculiar taxonomy it is conveyed—such as the enthralling
symbolism of the “American Dream” in the United States then, people are ingrained with the
powerfully constructed ethos that theirs:
Is a land of limitless opportunity in which individuals can go as far as their merit takes
them.... You get out of the system what you put into it....Getting ahead is based on individual
merit, including innate abilities, working hard, having the right attitude, and having high moral
character and integrity. (McNamee and Miller, Jr., 2004, p. 1)
These progressive principles, which have since survived both the ferment of the global
culture wars and the backlash of Eurocentrism, have been embraced as both the embodiment of
meritocracy and part of civic culture. They have been engineered and thoroughly embedded into
orthodox social contracts across societies (Webb, 2006) and are drilled into successive cohorts
during socialization as the proper path to a good life (Cech & Blair-Loy, 2019; Jorgenson, 2002),
although their actual manifestations differ from one polity to another.
Societies, even more traditional enclaves such as those in the Middle East brimming with
“wasta” or favoritism (Alghanim, 2014) and SSA still rooted in customs orthodoxy, venerate
these doctrines as an ideal transformative tool for human development. They are seen as
advancing the public good, and society generally (Lim, 2016). However, the greatest appeal of
these doctrines at the societal level as nation states attain the cultural shift consistent with
movement toward capitalism (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart, 1990), appears to stem from
two intrinsic linkages. One is their obvious connection to liberal—“rational”—democracy
(Rawls, 1999). The other is their embodiment of the invisible hand—whereby, they provide
prospect for individuals to contribute to the common good, as they prosecute self-interest (Faust,
2015; Brosio, 1994).4
Meritocracy and SSA’s Nation Building Conundrum
Whatever the original endowment, there is broad agreement that the doctrine of meritocracy as
part of both the social contract and civic culture have come under intense pressure in SSA, where
the socioeconomic hardship that has hit many countries because of sinking oil prices, poor
resource management, widespread elite corruption, China’s slowing economy, and political
turmoil has created gloom (Swanson & Sieff, 2016). The crisis has been such that those who
3

The author is aware of the sentiments evoked by meritocracy, where, for instance, “a moral or social system in
which regard had for noting but merit and in which those lacking merit are disregarded” may offend humanists
(Attfield, 1996, p.10). Moreover, the author is also aware of the numerous social issues associated with the general
idea of meritocracy, especially the danger of approaching differences as “naturally” occurring, without equal weight
to the many forces such as initial endowments and discrimination that structure opportunities and outcomes. While
the purpose of this paper is not to vet these debates, one must acknowledge their legitimacy. See also UNDP
(2015); Douthat (2018); Morgan, Tumlinson, and Vardy (2018), and Sandel (2021).
4
As McNamee and Miller Jr. (2004, p. 10) correctly note, “it is generally acknowledged that a pure meritocracy is
probably impossible to achieve.” Thus, pure meritocracy is not contemplated here, not even for the U.S. (Hayes,
2012; The Economist, 2004).
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could, have since emigrated, while many others continue to work to perfect their exit. Those who
remain continue to eke out a living the best they can (Morgan, 2010; Okorie, 2015).
While the economic hardship has no doubt been excruciating, what has the capability of
doing durable harm to human development (and the social contract, Levy & Kpundeh, 2004) is
the pervasive speculation that the dire material conditions are beginning to muddle the human
psyche.5 In particular, the prospect that orientation to MI, however much of it is rooted in SSA to
start with, may be mutating into “The Meritocracy Myth”—where what society promises through
hard work and personal investment consistently falls short of what it actually delivers—is raising
concern.6 Across SSA, the masses groan under abject poverty, while (ex)public officials and
other knaves flaunt their ill-gotten wealth—the former from the widespread looting of their
nations’ commonwealth (Burgis, 2015).
Everywhere one turns, it seems the returns to “deviance” (using personal connections,
cheating, corruption and pilfering, manipulation, and patronage) are outpacing orthodox
prescriptions of MI, as the gap between its promise and the reality on the ground about its
performance appears irreconcilable. As McNamee and Miller, Jr. (2004) note, this “social
gravity” (SG) – that is, the gap between what orthodox MI promises and what it actually delivers
- occurs with the appearance of “a variety of non-merit factors that suppress, neutralize, or even
negate the effects of merit and create barriers to individual mobility” (p. 1).
Social Theory and SSA’s Meritocracy Paradox
Inglehart (2006), Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel (2002), Inglehart and Baker (2000), Inglehart
(1990), Inglehart (1977), and Inglehart (1990) offer theories that embody strong predictive
typologies for the meritocracy narrative in SSA. Broadly, this body of work contends that the
level of a nation’s industrialization and economic development affects citizens’ value orientation.
Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) summarize the premise succinctly:
...as nations undergo the process of industrialization and modernization, attitudes
and values shift away from concerns about physical and economic security to
worldviews that are increasingly rational, tolerant, and trusting. Instead of
worrying about how to fulfill basic needs like food, shelter, and safety, people
become increasingly interested in issues related to subjective well-being, quality
of life, and self-expression (p. 340).
If countries’ levels of industrialization and modernization affect their citizens’ attitudes
and value orientation, and higher levels of industrialization and modernization increase selfexpression, then one can expect greater levels of orientation to MI by citizens of more
industrialized countries. Based on their tortuous colonial histories, levels of industrialization, and
stages on the march toward capitalism, for instance, one could readily predict that the American
and British publics would embody higher levels of orientation to MI than SSA publics—the
5

The study of the effect of the material conditions of production and consumption on the human psyche, made
famous by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, is a well celebrated line of inquiry (see https://www.marxists.org/
archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm).
6
The Meritocracy Myth is defined by McNamee and Miller, Jr. (2004) as the gap between what MI promises and
how the system works short of that premised outcome. See News24. “On the Myth of South African Meritocracy”
(http://www.news24.com/mynews24/On-the-myth-of-South-African-meritocracy-20140515) for some commentary
on Africa.
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latter still in their initial transitional phases. Moreover, this may also become more complicated
by another crucial catalyst in the SSA context. As Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) also note:
...when a nation is regularly faced with political and economic uncertainty and
insecurity (as most SSA nations are), people are more likely to support values and
norms that emphasize the familiar (citing Inglehart, Norris, & Welzel, 2002). As a
result, people in nations that are characterized by a strong survivalist orientation
(as most SSA nations are) may be less tolerant of nontraditional ideas and
lifestyles (p.340).
The foregoing suggests that the survivalist environment of SSA will discount orientation
to MI. Ironically, canvassing MI in the region produces something of a paradox because, while
SSA clearly welcomes many attributes of meritocracy—rugged individualism over group
affiliation, and other modalities accompanying the march toward industrialization—these are at
odds with the region’s communal cultural heritage.
Canvassing Meritocracy in Pre-Colonial SSA
SSA traditional beliefs were not consistent with the notion of equality of persons (Tangwa, 2010,
p. 8). Nor did the practice of collective action produce a singular form of governance
arrangement (Osafo-Kwaako & Robinson, 2013). While scholarly agreement remains that
whatever governance arrangements that existed produced a great deal of egalitarianism across
the adult population through group membership (Shumway, 2013), there was a sharp social
stratification firmly anchored in a culture of privilege, where everyone had his or her place and
considerable community resources were expended enforcing those partitions. Royal blood was
supposed to have run in a bloodline and it was desirable to maintain the purity of that lineage, as
well as make it traceable to ward off impostors. The gallantry (“warrior”) blood was restricted to
some families and it was crucial to delineate and harness that bloodline for the collective good.
The intellectual blood flowed within some families, while other families were artisans. There
was also the caste system of individuals thought inferior or less endowed (Aluko, 2002).
Families were ascribed certain roles based on the “natural” endowments they supposedly
possessed. Parents supposedly bequeathed them to their posterity through their “genes.” These
rigid spatial designations also meant that these were communities where initial endowments at
birth determined the life-course (Perbi, 1991). They were communities steeped in the purest
traditions of Calvinism’s doctrine of providence and predestination, where (their own deity) was
supposed to have preordained things and had chosen individuals not based on virtue or merit, but
by sheer will. People were supposed to embrace their social placement willy-nilly and “play the
hand they were dealt.”
While “restrictions on social mobility were woven into the fabric of the state” (The
Economist, 2004), there was no simple stimulus for rise of stratification (Tuden & Plotnicov,
1970). Once in place, however, many normative factors guided social barriers to entry (Mazrui,
1978)—although their influence varied across space and time. These factors are chronicled to
include family background, clan/tribe, gender, age, birth right (particularly being first son or
daughter), and, in polygamous settings, both wife and child number (Perbi, 1991). These
transformed into rigid social formations such as gender, age, and titled groups, cults and secret
societies, and others that formed the bases for community solidarity and action, social cohesion,
and exercise of sovereignty.
7
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Of course, this is not to suggest that traditional SSA societies were bereft of meritocracy,
however defined. These were environments where inter-tribal conflicts were routine. Thus,
personal gallantry at war contributed to stratification of community warriors (Mazrui, 1978, p.
15). Also, success in intra- and inter-community social contests (wrestling matches, pain
endurance, such as walking on fires and body piercing/tattooing, lifting and throwing, running
and jumping, climbing, canoeing, hunting and angling, confronting danger) and other activities
that tested human ingenuity, endurance, and survival instincts served as concrete bases for
stratification and group hierarchy (Blackburn, 2006, p. 52). These human feats are not unlike the
endeavors in modern competitive events such as the Olympic Games and professional sports.
The difference is that these feats, while duly celebrated, did not facilitate inter-group upward
mobility. Thus, a great warrior was venerated for his gallantry, which nudged him to the apex of
the warrior stratum; however, that could not transpose him to another group stratum, say, the
chieftaincy (Perbi, 1991).
Governance was an exclusive preserve that especially did not lend itself to upper mobility
through personal achievement. The top position of community leadership was characteristically
filled through family lineage and birthright (Perbi, 1991). Governing elites were typically
composed of members of the chieftaincy (Antwi-Boasiako & Bonna, 2009), council of elders, or
by whatever other nomenclature affixed. As Antwi-Boasiako and Bonna note, “there is no
evidence in the limited chieftaincy literature that argues that those who become chief are based
on merit” (p. 133). Such positions in the governing elites were pre- determined by family and
clan lineage, within which birthright ultimately imposed the final choice (Tangwa, 2010, p. 8).
Canvassing Meritocracy in Post-Colonial SSA
Human societies are always in flux (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart, 1990). Internal
imperatives partly explain that flux (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2005; Inglehart & Baker, 2000;
Mamdani, 1996; Inglehart, 1990; Sheriff, 1974). However, there is consensus that, for better or
worse, Africa’s contact with Europeans through the duo exogenous forces of colonization and
globalization has been the potent animator of SSA’s transformation (Amadi, Imo-Ita, &
Obomanu, 2016; Falola, 2002; Fredland, 2001). The subsequent “Europeanization” that has left
the region dangling between the indigenous and the acquired did not materialize immediately
because of the vagaries of colonialism (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013; Falola, 2002;
Mamdani, 1996). However, the combined sustained effects of both catalysts have produced a
paradox for meritocracy. On the one hand, Africans are cognizant of their communal cultural
heritage (Shumway, 2013). On the other hand, they have also been bequeathed alternative
societal arrangements that, although markedly appealing in sundry ways, are evidently at odds
with their folkways (Garba, 2012). The strategy for pitching them the new dispensation has been
wholesale discounting of that indigenous cultural heritage as “barbarous” and “unprogressive”—
an albatross that must be unbundled in place of the bequeathed superior culture, if they are to
achieve modernity (Mark, 2011; Falola, 2007; Fredland, 2001; Mazrui, 1978).
Part of this “loftier” culture wrought by colonialism, Tangwa (2010, p. 11) discerns, are
the subversive dictatorial systems of control inherited after independence, which African leaders
tried to justify by appeal to the need for national unity. Fisher (2012) also cites national unity for
Africans’ acceptance of the imaginary national borders willed by the colonialists upon their
departure. However, the most profound effects of colonialism on meritocracy derived from two
decisive catalysts, both imposed by imperialism. One is the imposition of western education
(Dauda & Falola, 2016; Garba, 2012; Mazrui, 1978), while the other is introduction of the
western career civil service system (Ayee, 2001). Unlike traditional African education anchored
8
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on functionalism through apprenticeship that produced adults ready to engage in specifically
targeted socioeconomic roles, Garba (2012) observes that western education emphasized
examination results and abstract paper qualification, both of which augured well with
modernization (Lloyd, 1975). With the introduction of western civil service, the new education
system became the benchmark for positioning government bureaucracies and touting meritocracy
(Mangan, 1990).
Africa has undergone at least three phases of globalization (Kwame, 2006). According to
Kwame, the first, the period of international contacts, involved trade, including the trans-Atlantic
Slave Trade. The second was colonialism, when European powers consolidated their imperialist
powers over Africa, perfected about 1884 with the Berlin Conference. The third is the “new”
globalization, defined by Giddens (1990, p. 64), as “intensification of worldwide social relations
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring
many miles away and vice versa.” The global emphasis on SSA since independence has been on
the crises in governance and socioeconomic development (NEPAD, 2012). Given SSA’s legacy
of parochialism marred by nepotism, tribalism, ethnicity, regionalism, religiosity, party loyalty,
and political clientelism (Langer & Ukiwo, 2007), achieving efficiency through spread of good
governance remains a priority (UNDP, 2015; Olowu, Barkan, & Ng׳ethe, 2004; Ayee, 2001).
SSA is clearly still steeped in ancient customs while it juggles its caustic colonial heritage
(Mamdani, 1996). Education and the civil service (including private-sector bureaucratic
employment) have provided the greatest platforms for instilling MI in the mass publics (Mazrui,
1978). Although noticeable progress has been made in education, the mass publics remain with
little or no access to formal education, with the girl-child still relatively disadvantaged (Watkins,
2013). Much of the pressure from globalization is concentrated on de-politicization of the civil
service (UNDP, 2015); however, both the multiplier and trickle- down benefits of the external
pressure for change mounted by globalization have permeated the entire political economy
(Andrews, 2013; Fredland, 2001). Such pressures have come particularly from international
institutions such as the United Nations and its many field organizations (UN), The International
Monetary Fund (IMF), to mention just a few.
The foregoing amplifies the two core questions underlying the current research. First,
what is the reservoir of mass identification with the tenets of meritocracy? This question is
important because it points to what needs to be done at the community level if the reservoir of
the tenets of meritocracy is not sufficiently high to anchor community quest for meritocracy.
Second, what factors are associated with inter-personal variations in levels of identification with
the elements of meritocracy? Unlike the first, this question points to what needs to be done at the
margin to elevate adherence to the principles of meritocracy. Combined, these two areas of
inquiry form the nexus of action required to enhance meritocracy in SSA.
Data and Methodology
The data are drawn from Pew’s 2014 Spring Global Attitudes and Trends Survey (Pew, 2014).
The survey covered adults 18 years of age and over across 44 countries. Seven SSA countries
were included in the survey (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and
Uganda). Their sub-samples used in the study are presented in the Appendix. Ultimately, 7052
adults were interviewed in the region. As noted earlier, these seven nations are not posited as
representative of the entire SSA region. They happen to be the only SSA countries included in
Pew’s survey. While these countries deserve to be studied in their own rights, the set of questions
on meritocracy enabling this research are unique in that they are not typically asked of mass
populations in SSA. The sample is also appealing in that it spans the entire SSA regions, includes
9
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both Anglophone and Francophone countries, and showcases both the most populous and largest
economies.
Measuring MI and SG
Meritocracy encompasses many abstract notions. However, the most accepted and familiar is the
typology that insists that “getting ahead in life” be driven by individual talent, merit, and hard
work, as opposed to any form of particularism, such as family background, etc. According to
McNamee and Miller Jr. (2004), the two most prominent elements of this typology are
educational qualifications and a good work ethic. Question 66 on Pew’s survey reads as follows:
“I am going to read to you a list of things that might be important for getting ahead in life. On a
scale of 0 to 10, in your opinion, how important is it --- to get ahead in life, where 0 means not
important at all and 10 means very important?” Choices include:
A) To have a good education;
B) To work hard;
C) To know the right people;
D) To give bribes;
E) To be a male;
F) To belong to a wealthy family; and
G) To be lucky.
Respondents were also provided with the opportunity of saying “don’t know” or to “refuse” to
answer. These last two categories lacked enough numbers for separate analysis and were deleted.
McNamee and Miller Jr.’s (2004) two elements of the universal MI are captured by
options A and option B (to have a good education and to work hard). Thus, throughout this
analysis, these two options are presented as surrogate measures for orientation toward MI.
Conversely, items C, D, E, F, and G deviate from the notion of getting ahead being driven by
qualifications and personal merit and, therefore, are applied as measures of “deviance” or “social
gravity” (SG) factors (McNamee and Miller, Jr., 2004). Since each option is a 0 to 10 scale, the
options are taken at their respective means to represent the weight respondents are assigning
them with respect to what it takes to get ahead in life. Thus, the closer the score is to 10, the
greater the weight being accorded to the item by the respondent. The scores on these options are
used to formulate the dependent variables, where higher scores on options A and B are generally
held as evidence of stronger orientation toward MI, while higher scores on the rest of the items
are conceived as greater orientation toward non-meritocracy.
Explanatory Variables
Several explanatory variables that could impact orientation to MI are included in the analysis.
They include gender, measured as a dummy with men taking the value of 1 and women 0; age,
measured as the actual age of the respondent; education, measured as a four-part dummy
indicating no formal, primary, secondary, and post-secondary education 7; marital status, with
those married/cohabiting taking a value of 1, and 0 otherwise; employment, where those with
paid employment score a 1, and 0 otherwise; religion is a three-part dummy with Christian,
Muslim, and Other as categories; urbanization, with urban residents coded 1, others 0; and the
number of biological children the respondent has had also as a continuous variable.
7

Education for the analytical models is measured as a continuous value, starting with 1 for no formal education.
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Data are reported on household income. However, such data cannot capture consumption
levels in SSA, where most are informally employed, and income is not calculated and declared
for purposes of taxation. As suspected, an initial diagnosis of the income variable reveals many
missing observations relaying, in part, this confusion about reporting income in such a survey.
To better capture consumption, like other studies in SSA (e.g., Isaksson et al., 2014), the study
used Question 148, asking respondents whether they had a television, refrigerator, computer, car,
bicycle, motorcycle or scooter, and radio in working order in their households. Ownership of
these items in SSA clearly capture social status. An additive score of economic status was
developed awarding each item a score of 1. Because of its overpowering position, the presence
of a car was awarded six points, making it possible for one who has all items to score six points
and no combination of scores can exceed six without a car being present. At the same time, the
presence of a car guarantees more than six points. This scoring was arbitrary, but it captures level
of consumption much better than anything the standard income variable could produce.
Several other factors, some instrumental variables, are also included. Question 2a
presents respondents with a “ladder of life” with a range of 0 to 10, where zero represents the
worst possible life, while 10 represents the best and asks respondents to locate where they feel
they stand now. Question 9 asks respondents their feeling about the current economic situation of
the country, whether good or bad. Those saying good are coded 1, others are coded 0. Question
12 asks: “What would you recommend to a young person in our country today who wants a good
life? Should they move to another country, or stay in survey country? Respondents
recommending moving to another country are coded 1, those recommending staying put are
coded 0. Question 13b asks the respondent to agree or disagree with the statement “Success in
life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control.” Respondents who agree are coded
as 1, those who disagree are coded 0.
Estimation
Three kinds of insights are of interest. The first is to establish patterns of mass orientation to MI.
This is accomplished using cumulative descriptive statistics that provide direct comparisons. At
this level of analysis, data for both the United Kingdom and the United States are brought in to
provide context. The second kind of insight allows for estimating factors that account for interpersonal variations in orientation to MI. This requires inferential statistics. Since the dependent
variable is a continuous range of 0 to 10, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is used to
estimate the multivariate models. The third and final insight pertains to establishing factors that
explain meritocracy and social gravity distance, defined as the difference between the averages
of the two combined MI options, minus the averages of the total score on the four social gravity
factors. Here, OLS multivariate estimation is also employed. All models incorporate country
fixed-effects designed to capture the effect of level of industrialization and modernization
(Inglehart, 1977). South Africa, despite its violent political history of apartheid, serves as the
reference category throughout, having had the most industrialized economy in the region for
long.
The estimated models are of the form:
Y(M)i = α = βXi + e

(1)
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Where, M is the yth respondent’s score on MI and X is the vector of the explanatory variables
explaining that score for the yth respondent, including the country fixed-effects. In the instance
of the ideological distance score, the models estimated are of the form:
Y(M-S)i = α = βXi + e

(2)

Where, M-S is the yth respondent’s ideological distance score (meritocracy minus Social
distance) and X is the vector of the explanatory variables explaining that score, including country
fixed-effects.
Empirical Results
The sampling profile for the data appears in the Appendix, while the basic statistics are presented
in Table1. SSA Men and women are well represented in both the regional and country subsamples. The typical respondent was 35 years of age. Men are more likely to have both formal
and higher education. The struggle for girl-child education that has occurred in the last two
decades appears to have closed the gender gap in primary school education.
However, the gender gaps on overall access and attainment of higher education are still
evident. As should be expected in a patriarchal region, women are less likely to be formally
employed, but more likely to be married or cohabiting. Consistent with the spread of Christianity
in SSA, the respondents were predominantly Christian, with close to half resident in urban areas.
The typical respondent has had about four biological children. The respondents score themselves
halfway on the “ladder of life” and half rates their country economy as good. About 30 percent
would recommend that a young person who wants a good life to exit their countries, while
almost 60 percent agree that success in life is determined by forces outside our control. These
latter variables display no significant gender gaps.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics (Weighted Means)
Variable
All
Gender (men)
50.8%
Age
35.2
Education
No formal education
20.9%
Primary education
22.5%
Secondary
46.9%
Post-secondary
9.6%
Marital status
52.8%
Economic statusa
3.1
Employment status
43.8%
Religion
Christian
64.7%
Muslim
29.9%
Other religion
5.5%
Urban status
43.2%
Biological children
3.8
Ladder of life
5.4
Country economy good
47.8%
Advice: move to another country
28.7%
Success outside forces
59.9%
N
7052
a

Range is 0-12 for all three groups (All, Men, Women).

SD
14.8

2.7

12.6
2.1

Men
50.8%
35.7
17.1%
21.5%
49.4%
12.0%
51.9%
3.3
50.5%
63.5%
29.9%
6.6%
41.3%
3.9
5.4
48.6%
29.1%
61.4%
3585

SD
15.3

2.8

13.2
2.1

Women
49.1%
34.6
24.8%
23.5%
44.4%
7.2%
53.7%
2.9
36.9%
65.6%
29.9%
4.3%
45.1%
3.7
5.5
46.9%
28.2%
58.3%
3467

SD
14.3

2.6

12.1
2.1
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Mass Orientation to MI in SSA
The first sets of data showing mass orientation to MI in SSA are displayed in Table 2. The data
in Table 2 are designed to provide two kinds of insights. The first, using the SSA portion of the
table, showcases mass orientation to MI in SSA. The second, using both the United Kingdom
and United States portions of the table, offers some comparative analyses, analyses that provide
some benchmark for assessing the results for SSA. Looking first at the results for SSA, the two
items capturing orientation to MI—education (Mean=8.7) and hard work (Mean=8.6)—exhibit
very high scores out of a maximum of 10 points each. These results suggest high levels of
orientation to MI in SSA. At the same time, many items of SG also display robust loadings.
Specifically, knowing the right people (Mean=8.1) and being lucky (Mean=8.2) exhibit scores
directly comparable to those of MI. The only item which clearly lags is giving bribe (Mean=2.7).
Table 2 Weighted Means on Measures of MI and SG
Sub-Saharan Africa
United States
All
Men
Women
All
Men Women
Item
Education
8.7
8.7
8.6
8.9
8.8
9.2
Work hard
8.6
8.7
8.6
9.3
9.2
9.4
(1.9) (1.9)
(1.9)
(1.7) (1.8)
(1.5)
Know people
8.1
8.1
8.1
7.8
7.8
7.8
(1.9) (1.9)
(1.9)
(1.5) (1.5)
(1.4)
Give bribes
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.3
2.4
2.2
(2.2) (2.2)
(2.2)
(2.1) (2.1)
(2.1)
Male
6.2
7.1
5.3
5.4
5.1
5.6
(3.3)
(3.3)
(3.3)
(3.0)
(2.9)
(3.1)
Belong to
7.5
7.6
7.5
6.0
5.9
6.1
(3.4)
(3.1)
(2.5)
(3.1)
(2.9)
(3.2)
Get
lucky
8.2
8.2
8.2
5.2
5.3
5.2
family
(2.7)
(2.7)
(2.7)
(3.2)
(3.2)
(3.2)
N
7052
3467
1002
488
514
(2.3) 3585
(2.3)
(2.4)
(3.3) (3.2)
(3.4)

United Kingdom
All
Men
Women
8.4
8.6
9.0
9.1
8.8
9.3
(1.7)
(1.9)
(1.5)
7.8
7.9
7.7
(1.4)
(1.7)
(1.9)
2.6
2.9
2.3
(2.0)
(2.0)
(1.9)
4.9
4.5
5.4
(3.0)
(3.1)
(2.9)
6.2
6.1
6.3
(2.9)
(2.9)
(2.9)
6.1
6.0
6.2
(2.9)
(3.0)
(2.9)
1000
462
538
(2.9)
(2.9)
(2.9)

NOTE: Mean scores are out of a maximum score of 10 points. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.

The data for gender demonstrates a similar distributional pattern, portending that SSA
men and women view meritocracy comparably. The only item that signifies a gender gap is the
factor of being male—mean for men=7.1, and that of women=5.3. Surprisingly, SSA men are
more inclined than women to see being male as advantageous. This is an important finding for
the gender studies literature, as it is contrary to popular speculation that SSA women have
become broadly sensitized to the issue of gender inequities in their patriarchal social milieu.
Perhaps the outcome is explained by socialization in SSA that still largely differentiates (and
justifies, often with both culture and religion) between gender roles. Taken together, though, the
big picture that emerges from the data is the suggestion that while mass orientation to MI is
robust in SSA, SG factors—especially knowing the right people, being lucky, and coming from a
wealthy family—are equally strong. Thus, at least as regards mass orientation, SSA is not
confronted with the binary specter of orientation or lack of orientation to MI. Instead, the data
suggests a domain of fierce competition between elements of meritocracy and non-meritocracy.
The result for “being lucky” needs a little more explication. Quite a bit of literature has
developed on the explosive growth of prosperity religion in SSA (see Gifford, 1990 for
synthesis). This is a strand of Christianity that emphasizes material prosperity and consumerist
orientation. The point of relevance with the “being lucky” phenomenon observed in these data is
the fact that while prosperity pastors preach wealth accumulation and consumerist orientation,
they do not necessarily augment their preaching with hard work as underlying that success.
Instead, they bombard their parishioners with the specter of immediate and miracle wealth,
fostered by “sowing seed” in church. Given the proportion of respondents in the data set
identifying themselves as Christians, perhaps the results on “being lucky” is tapping some of this
prosperity religion phenomenon of wealth from other than hard work.
13
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Let us now turn to the comparative data for the U. K. and the U. S. As already noted, both
countries are much further along in capitalism and modernization than SSA. The data do not
evince robust differences on orientation to MI. If anything, the story worthy of note emerges
with the SG measures, where the scores for SSA are robust, while those for the U.S. and U.K. are
relatively weaker. Evidently, to the extent SSA differs from these two countries, it does not
revolve on the American and British masses being more strongly oriented to MI per se. Rather, it
revolves around the fact that the SG factors appear to be weighing more heavily, and competing
more intensely, with MI in SSA than in either country.
The data in Table 3 and Figure 2 display country-specific data on orientation to MI.
Except in Tanzania where the general scores for the elements MI drop below 8.0, all other SSA
countries show strong orientation to MI. While inter-country variations are clearly small, the
strongest orientations are in Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, and South Africa. Regardless of
the degree of orientation to MI, the scores for SG items are high across the board, mirroring the
observation for SSA above that SG factors are competing quite aggressively with MI (see
graphical illustration presented in Figure 2). To the extent one could speak of SSA countries
where this competition between MI and SG is not as acute, South Africa, Kenya, and Tanzania
stand out. Knowing the right people and getting lucky are particularly salient across the board.
Just like the analysis in Table 2, giving bribes remained weak throughout. This weakness may
owe to the fact that bribery is associated more with single, spontaneous transactions with shorterterm results than the kind of long-term, continuous yielding, associated with the other gravity
factors.
Figure 1 Combined Elements of the Meritocracy Ideology in Sub-Saharan Africa

An important observation in Table 3 is the virtual absence of a gender gap. This absence
obtains for both MI and SG. The only gender gap occurs on the item of being male. In every
country, men scored higher on this item, indicating that men see their gender more of an issue
than women do. Not only is this general inclination manifest across the board, but these gaps are
quite robust in places, being as much as 3 points in Tanzania, 2.7 points in Ghana, and 2.5 points
in Nigeria. As already noted, this is a significant finding in a patriarchal region where women are
thought to be debilitated by men’s supremacy.
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Table 3 Weighted Means of Measures of MI and SG (Country Profiles)
Ghana
Kenya
All
Men
Women
All
Men
M
SD
M(N=486)
SD M
SD M
SD M(N=517)
SD
(N=1000)
(N=514)
(N=1015)
Education
9.1
1.9
9.0
2.1 9.1 1.9 8.0
2.4 7.9
2.5
Item
1
Work hard
9.1
1.5
9.1
1.5 9.0 1.5 8.1
2.2 8.0
2.2
Right people
8.6
2.0
8.7
1.9 8.5 2.1 7.4
2.3 7.4
2.3
Give bribes
2.3
3.4
2.3
3.2 2.3 3.1 2.8
2.9 2.7
2.9
Be male
5.3
3.9
6.6
3.5 3.9 3.7 5.2
2.9 5.7
2.9
Wealthy family
8.3
2.3
8.4
2.2 8.2 2.5 6.5
2.6 6.5
2.6
Be lucky
8.6
2.1
8.7
2.2 8.6 2.2 7.2
2.4 7.3
2.3
Nigeria
Senegal
All
Men
Women
All
Men
(N=1014)
(513)
(501)
(1000)
(509)
M
SD
M
SD M
SD M
SD M
SD
Education
9.4
1.3
9.4
1.2 9.4 1.2 9.42 1.3 9.42 1.3
Work hard
8.9
1.6
8.9
1.6 8.7 1.6 8.92 1.6 8.92 1.5
Right people
8.8
1.6
8.8
1.6 8.2 2.1 8.3
2.1 8.3
2.1
Give bribes
2.9
3.8
2.9
3.7 2.7 2.9 2.7
2.9 2.7
3.0
Be male
7.1
3.4
8.3
2.6 6.6 3.3 6.8
3.2 7.1
3.0
Wealthy family
8.4
2.1
8.4
2.1 7.2 2.9 7.1
2.9 7.1
2.9
Be lucky
8.9
1.7
8.9
1.7 8.7 2.0 8.6
2.1 8.5
2.1
South Africa
Tanzania
All
Men
Women
All
Men
(1000)
(500)
(500)
(1016)
(503)
M
SD
M
SD M
SD M
SD M
SD
Education
9.1
1.6
9.22 1.5 9.0 1.6 7.9
2.4 8.0
2.4
1
Work hard
8.6
2.0
8.7
2.0 8.5 2.0 7.9
2.3 8.1
2.2
Right people
8.4
2.1
8.4
2.2 8.5 2.1 6.9
2.6 6.9
2.6
Give bribes
4.0
3.8
3.9
3.8 4.1 3.9 2.1
2.9 2.2
3.0
Be male
5.9
3.4
6.8
3.1 5.1 3.5 6.4
3.1 6.9
2.9
Wealthy family
7.3
2.9
7.4
2.9 7.2 2.9 6.8
2.6 6.7
2.7
Be lucky
7.6
2.7
7.6
2.7 7.6 2.6 7.3
2.5 7.3
2.5
Uganda
All
Men
Women
(1007)
(557)
(450)
M
SD
M
SD M
SD
Education
9.0
1.8
9.1
1.7 9.0 1.9
Work hard
8.8
2.0
8.8
2.0 8.7 2.0
Right people
8.3
2.1
8.3
2.2 8.3 2.2
Give bribes
2.2
2.9
2.2
2.9 2.3 2.9
Be male
6.9
3.5
8.3
2.5 5.3 3.8
Wealthy family
8.3
2.5
8.4
2.3 8.2 2.7
Be lucky
9.1
1.8
9.1
1.9 9.1 1.8

Women
M (498)SD
8.11 2.4
8.21 2.1
7.5
2.3
2.8
2.8
4.6
2.9
6.5
2.6
8.6
2.2
Women
(491)
M
SD
9.4
1.2
8.7
1.6
8.2
2.1
2.7
2.9
6.6
3.3
7.2
2.9
8.7
2.0
Women
(513)
M
SD
7.9
2.4
7.9
2.4
6.9
2.6
2.0
2.9
5.6
3.1
6.8
2.7
7.4
2.6

NOTE: All scores range from 0 to 10, except where otherwise indicated. M=Mean;
SD=Standard Deviation. 1Scores range from 1 to 10. 2Scores range from 2 to 10.
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Explaining Inter-Personal Differences in Orientation to MI
The results of the three multivariate OLS regression models explaining inter-personal differences
in orientation to MI are displayed in Table 4. The first (All) is for the entire sample, while the
other two are men’s and women’s sub-samples, respectively. The macro-evaluative statistics
across all three models (F-Ratios and Adjusted R2s) are robust, signifying that the independent
variables are successful in explaining inter-personal differences in MI scores. Looking first at the
specification for “All”, neither gender, age, education, urbanism, nor number of children explain
differences in orientation to MI. Conversely, lived life factors such as being married, having
formal employment, economic standing, and religion are associated with orientation to MI.
Marriage, employment, and higher economic status all boost orientation to MI. Respondents who
see themselves as doing well in life are strongly oriented to MI, while those who generally score
their country’s economic performance high are less oriented to MI. Expectedly, advice to young
people looking for a good life to exit the country is negatively linked to MI, correctly signaling
lack of faith in the system. The country fixed effects confirm the variability of levels of
orientation to MI, with Kenya and Tanzania trailing other countries.
Figure 2 Meritocracy v. Social Gravity in SSA

The sub-sample specifications indicate gender interaction effects. While higher economic
status is linked to more robust orientation to MI for men, being in a relationship, educational
attainment, and formal employment provide that linkage for women, although these linkages are
clearly weaker than the linkage for men. These analyses further reveal that, while religion is not
a factor for men, it discounts orientation to MI among women who are not Christians or
Muslims. Finally, although men and women who view themselves as having done well in life are
more oriented to MI, that relationship is obviously stronger for men. Only in Kenya and Uganda
are the gender gaps in orientation robust.
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Figure 3 Combined Elements of the Meritocracy Ideology in Sub-Saharan Africa

Table 4 OLS Analysis of Factors Explaining MI Score
Variable
All
Gender (male)
-.01
(0.39)
Age
-.02+
(1.78)
Marital status (married)
.04*
(2.79)
Education
.04**
(2.95)
Employed
.02+
(1.67)
Urban
.02
(1.43)
Underage children
-.03*
(2.01)
Economic status
.02
(1.35)
Religiona
Muslim
-.02
(1.16)
Other religion
.01
(0.72)
Success forces beyond control
-.01
(0.73)
Position on “ladder of life”
-.01
(0.44)
Country’s economy doing well
-.01
(0.84)
Want a good life: move
.00
(0.33)
Country fixed-effectsb
Ghana
.08***
(4.70)
Kenya
.10***
(5.48)
Nigeria
.02
(0.95)
Senegal
.08***
(3.80)
Tanzania
.08***
Uganda
.07***
(3.73)
(4.59)
Constant
0.07
(0.16)
R2 (x100)
14.0
Adjusted R2 (x100)
11.0
F-Ratio
4.76***
N
6610

-.04*
.05*
.03+
.01
.03
-.04*
.02
-.02
.04+
-.02
.00
-.01
-.01

Men
-

(2.05)
(2.43)
(1.68)
(0.31)
(1.42)
(2.86)
(0.79)

Women
-.01
(0.52)
.04+
(1.87)
.06*
(2.53)
.03+
(1.74)
.01
(0.40)
-.01
(0.43)
.02
(1.09)

(0.81)
(1.95)
(1.33)
(0.04)
(0.79)
(0.28)

-.02
-.02
.00
-.01
-.01
.00

.07*
(2.69)
.11*** (4.37)
.03
(1.21)
.08**
(2.87)
.11*** (4.09)
.08**
(2.92)
0.42
(0.85)
16.0
10.0
2.86***
3342

(0.71)
(0.96)
(0.23)
(0.58)
(0.36)
(0.21)

.09*** (3.83)
.10*** (3.96)
.01
(0.32)
.08**
(2.59)
.07*
(2.64)
.06*
(2.46)
-0.41
(0.64)
17.0
11.0
2.89***
3268

NOTE: Dependent variable is the average of MI minus the average of SG. Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients.
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. a=Christianity is the reference category. b=South Africa is the reference category.
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. (Two-tailed tests).

17
Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2021

15

African Social Science Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 [2021], Art. 3
African Social Science Review

Volume 11 Number 1, Fall 2021

Explaining Inter-Personal Distance between MI and SG
The final analysis conducted estimates the factors that explain the MI-SG orientation distance.
As already noted, the dependent variable for this analysis is MI minus SG. Thus, a negative
effect means that variable decreases the gap between MI and SG, favoring disposition to SG.
Conversely, a positive effect means the variable heightens that gap, boosting orientation to MI.
These results are displayed in Table 5.
Table 5 OLS Analysis of Factors Explaining MI-SG Gap
Variable
All
Men
Gender (male)
-.01
(0.39)
Age
-.02+
(1.78) -.04*
(2.05)
Marital status (married)
.04*
(2.79)
.05*
(2.43)
Education
.04**
(2.95)
.03+
(1.68)
Employed
.02+
(1.67)
.01
(0.31)
Urban
.02
(1.43)
.03
(1.42)
Underage children
-.03*
(2.01)
-.04*
(2.86)
Economic status
.02
(1.35)
.02
(0.79)
Religiona
Muslim
-.02
(1.16) -.02
(0.81)
Other religion
.01
(0.72)
.04+
(1.95)
Success forces beyond control
-.01
(0.73) -.02
(1.33)
Position on “ladder of life”
-.01
(0.44)
.00
(0.04)
Country’s economy doing well
-.01
(0.84) -.01
(0.79)
Want a good life: move
.00
(0.33) -.01
(0.28)
Country fixed-effectsb
Ghana
.08***
(4.70)
.07*
(2.69)
Kenya
.10***
(5.48)
.11*** (4.37)
Nigeria
.02
(0.95)
.03
(1.21)
Senegal
.08***
(3.80)
.08**
(2.87)
Tanzania
.08***
.11*** (4.09)
Uganda
.07***
(3.73)
.08**
(2.92)
(4.59)
Constant
0.07
(0.16) 0.42
(0.85)
R2 (x100)
14.0
16.0
Adjusted R2 (x100)
11.0
10.0
F-Ratio
4.76***
2.86***
N
6610
3342

Women
-.01
(0.52)
.04+
(1.87)
.06*
(2.53)
.03+
(1.74)
.01
(0.40)
-.01
(0.43)
.02
(1.09)
-.02
-.02
.00
-.01
-.01
.00

(0.71)
(0.96)
(0.23)
(0.58)
(0.36)
(0.21)

.09*** (3.83)
.10*** (3.96)
.01
(0.32)
.08**
(2.59)
.07*
(2.64)
.06*
(2.46)
-0.41
(0.64)
17.0
11.0
2.89***
3268

NOTE: Dependent variable is the average of MI minus the average of SG. Cell entries are standardized regression
coefficients. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. aChristianity is the reference category. bSouth Africa is the
reference category.
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. (Two-tailed tests).

Again, the robust F-ratios and adjusted R2s convey that the models are successful in
explaining the gap. Focusing first on the results for the macro-model (All), marital status,
education, and employment enhance the gap in favor of MI, while age and the presence of
children diminish it in favor of SG. The country fixed effects indicate that, except for Nigeria,
status as a South African narrows the gap significantly across the board. This means, compared
to other countries, the gap between orientation to MI and SG is narrowest among South Africans.
This outcome also appears to be true in the gender sub-samples, which produced some important
interaction effects. Age and the presence of biological children decrease the gap for men, in
favor of SG, while marital status, education, and “other” religion increases the gap, in favor of
18
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MI. For women, none of the factors produces a negative effect, while marital status, education,
and employment all exert positive effects favoring MI. If there are notable gender effects in
Table 5, they will be on the results for education and employment. Education is not only the
factor with the greatest positive effect for women, but that effect is greater than that for men.
Employment shows a weak positive effect for women, but no effect at all for men.
Summary and Conclusions
The analyses reported here anchor on self-reported data. Accordingly, the author invokes all
caveats associated with the collection, use, and interpretation of such data, although the tight
research design and data collection techniques outlined by PEW greatly minimize sources of data
contamination. Secondly, the research is grounded on data from seven SSA countries. As already
noted, these countries are not necessarily representative of all SSA. Nor are these results being
postured as representing the entire region. This necessitates a warning over external validity or
the prospects of generalization of the findings. Given the nature of the baseline results, there is
no reason to anticipate that the policy implications of the research can only be confined to these
seven countries. Still, care must be taken about generalization.
The levels of orientation of Sub-Saharan Africans to MI differ. Country effects on
orientation to MI differ as well. Moreover, mass orientation to MI is alive and well among SSA’s
mass publics. Finally, the levels of mass orientation to MI observed among SSA, American, and
British publics do not differ markedly, although SG factors are more pronounced with SSA
publics. The first two of these observations are hardly profound and, are, in fact, predictable. The
third that suggests that mass orientation to MI is robust in SSA is what will surely raise eyebrows—a surprise that arises from the fact that the grim realities on the ground on meritocracy
do not match the levels of orientation to MI observed in these data. Obviously, the explanation
for this divergence touches upon cultural, economic, and political imperatives. One that will
likely garner consensus is the distortion that has arisen from SSA’s political culture of excessive
clientelism and spoils putting a wedge between the governors and the governed. As noted above,
because of the underdevelopment of the private sector, government is the only game in town in
many countries. To maintain their control, the ruling oligarchies centralize government and
manipulate both the mass publics and the resultant meagre private sector.
There is a second important matter associated with the finding of high levels of mass
orientation to MI in SSA. It concerns the speculation that perhaps the lack of meritocracy derives
from a corresponding lack of mass orientation to MI. This research crystalizes the picture. It has
become apparent that the question of whether there is mass orientation to MI in SSA is not the
right one. Mass orientation levels are adequate to create a fertile environment for meritocracy to
flourish. Rather, the precise question is what can be done to sustain mass orientation to MI and
its vast implications for the social contract in the face of intense rivalry from SG forces. This
presumption signals the futility of misplaced government policies lacking in either the courage to
defy the privileged elites, or that have misdiagnosed the problem as absence of mass orientation
to MI. Simultaneously, it opens the terrain up for appropriate policy action. An example of these
misplaced policies was Nigeria’s “Do the Right Thing: Transform Nigeria,” a national social
(re)engineering campaign initiated in 2005. It fell short of its promise (Constant 2010),
supporting the proposition in these data that the challenge awaiting SSA countries regarding their
prospects for cultivating a more meritocratic social milieu does not hinge on their capacity to
mobilize the mass media to bathe their publics with more abstract prescriptions of the
meritocracy creed with a view to expanding mass orientation.
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Such a flanking attack will yield little dividend. Instead, the prospect hinges on their
capacity to rein-in powerfully contending anti-meritocracy forces, chief among which appear to
be pervasive nepotism and trusting on sheer luck, the latter obviously partly a product of
ubiquitous overzealous charismatic/prosperity religiosity. About the latter, while many believe
prosperity religion, especially the pervasive notion that one can flourish through prayer and
accompanying miracles alone absent hard work, has taken its toll on the work ethic in SSA
countries, governments have done very little to bridge the widening gap between the preaching
and reality. In all cases, governments appear to have been cowed by incessant invocation of the
Bible verses “to not touch God’s anointed” by evangelists and other purveyors of the ‘get-richquick-without-work’ spectacle. However, there are many ways governments can intervene with
public information and institutional design to begin to correct, as well as reorient, their mass
publics away from such dogmas short of “touching the anointed”.
Given the diagnosis proffered by these data, then, more appropriate policies should
mount a direct and frontal attack on anti-meritocracy forces. They could begin with enactment
and vigorous enforcement of anti-nepotism and discrimination laws and policies of the kinds
already undertaken by industrialized countries. For instance, the U.S. Congress repudiated and
stepped in with an anti-nepotism statue, when President John F. Kennedy selected his brother,
Robert Kennedy, to serve as Attorney General of the U.S. That law has subsequently checkmated
President Donald Trump’s recent desire to employ family members in the U.S. government.
Congress has also enacted other progressive statues such as Title IX education and Title VII
Equal Employment Opportunity Acts and established the Office of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to police the Acts, all of which have variously advanced
meritocracy. Other policy options are those implied by the results for education and formal
employment, the latter both in the public and private sectors. Besides its immediate benefits,
education may become the game changer for cohort replacement, which some have suggested
might well be the only hope for transforming SSA.
There is a necessity to expand the private sector and grow the economy to enlarge the
size of the “pie.” Much of the desperation in SSA appears to be linked to the frantic zero-sum
scenario of too many people competing for too few opportunities, much of it within the limited
public sector. In Nigeria, for instance, only 5%-15% of candidates who are eligible, and apply,
get admitted to university annually (Aluede et al., 2012). This means 85 of every 100 applicants
will not secure admission—admission that, given the country’s constrained structure of
opportunity, decides much of the life-course. With the stakes so high, it is not surprising that
parents and students do “whatever it takes” to scale through, including duplicitous examinations,
bribery, and illicit sex. Similar levels of desperation are known in the area of securing
employment as well. For decades now, the emphasis in many SSA countries has been over
fighting for what is available, as opposed to trying to expand its size to reach the teeming
population. The size of both the unemployed and underemployed should awaken governments to
what must be done to stabilize their nations and resuscitate meritocracy.
At another level, two gender issues highlighted by the results are worthy of reiteration—
not only for their theoretical implications—but for their obvious policy implications as well. The
first concerns the gender gap in the perceived importance of maleness. In a tough patriarchal
setting like SSA, where women are not only socialized to behold men’s supremacy but live it in
every aspect of their daily lives, one would anticipate the male advantage to be a foremost sore
point for women responding to a survey pertaining to meritocracy. Instead, and surprisingly,
SSA women do not elevate the issue to the level of saliency that one would have ordinarily
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anticipated. Given the overwhelming, uncontested role of men as both heads and breadwinners
of their households in the SSA social milieu, one explanation might be that women have not
elevated this issue as part of their social consciousness at the grassroots. That is, it may echo
among highly educated and professional SSA women at the vanguard of the women’s
movement, but not among SSA women at the grassroots. The second issue concerns the effects
of education and formal employment. It was not surprising that women benefited the most from
both influences. Those who agitate for girl-child education and women’s formal employment
outside the home ground their case partly on the multiplier effects of both factors. The results
presented here extend those effects to orientation toward meritocracy, a factor some would
conceive as a strategic need required by women to uplift themselves.
Much more needs to be known about meritocracy in SSA. One study alone cannot cover
the entire spectrum of what needs systematic data gathering and analysis. For instance, one area
that needs urgent attention is the interaction of social and organizational culture and meritocracy.
Another is tribalism, intergroup dynamics, and meritocracy. All said, though, the SSA social
milieu is in dire need of cultural change when it comes to the discourse on meritocracy. In the
least, that change should touch upon the two dimensions of the distress over meritocracy. As I
noted much earlier in this research, my concern was not to engage the broader moral debate over
the worthiness of meritocracy as currently conceived and practiced. As that debate has been
perceived, one must concede it is a worthy discourse insofar as our conception of the “good”
society. However, such a debate has its place. My more immediate concern pertains to the
rational aspect of meritocracy as it is linked to bureaucratic arrangements and administrative
efficiency. At least, this is the aspect of meritocracy that has been bequeathed by colonization
and pushed through globalization to SSA countries as the right path to industrialization which, in
turn, drives modern democratic governments and administrative processes throughout the region.
It is clear from the research reported here that individuals in SSA do not pose a dilemma to the
fundamental precepts of meritocracy and thus should not be in the forefront of such cultural
change. Rather, the cultural change required the most appears to be about what should be
occurring in what many have long identified as the Achilles hill of SSA underdevelopment—
namely, the fragile, highly politicized, and massively corrupted social institutions and the
impenitent elites who control them.
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Appendix
Composition of the Country Samples
Respondents
All
Ghana
Kenya
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Tanzania
Uganda
(Non SSA)
United Kingdom
United States

All
7052
1000
1015
1014
1000
1000
1016
1007

Men
3585
486
517
513
509
500
503
557

Women
3467
514
498
501
491
500
513
450

1000
1002

462
488

538
514
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